Iran’s Nuclear Nondisclosure

Iran’s Nuclear Nondisclosure - WSJ:
Tehran hides its past weaponization work. 
The U.N. gives up.
President Obama sold his nuclear deal with Iran with promises that the accord would be based on “unprecedented verification,” and this week we were reminded of how much that promise was worth.
Witness the latest report on Iran’s nuclear program from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The IAEA is the U.N. outfit that is supposed to monitor Iran’s compliance with the agreement, which requires Tehran to answer the agency’s questions on its past nuclear work in order to obtain sanctions relief.
On Wednesday the agency produced its “final assessment”—the finality here having mostly to do with the U.N. nuclear watchdog giving up hope of ever getting straight answers.
Hence we learn that “Iran did not provide any clarification” regarding experiments the agency believes it conducted on testing components of nuclear components at its military facility at Parchin. “The information available to the Agency, including the results of the sampling analysis and the satellite imagery, does not support Iran’s statements on the purpose of the building,” says the report.
“The Agency assesses that the extensive activities undertaken by Iran since February 2012 at the particular location of interest to the Agency seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification.”
This seems to be A-OK with the Obama Administration, which made clear it’s prepared to accept any amount of Iranian stonewalling in order to move ahead with sanctions relief.
“We had not expected a full confession, nor did we need one,” an unnamed senior Administration official told the Journal.
One wonders why they even bothered with the charade.
Still, the report is illuminating on several points, above all its conclusion that Tehran continued to work on nuclear weapons research until 2009.
That further discredits the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which claimed Iran’s weapons program had ceased in 2003, and which effectively ended any chance that the Bush Administration would use military force against Iran’s nuclear sites.
It should also inspire some humility about the quality of Western intelligence regarding closed and hostile regimes such as Iran’s.
A 2014 report from the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board noted that at “levels associated with small or nascent [nuclear] programs, key observables are easily masked.”
Yet the Administration keeps insisting that Iran’s nondisclosures don’t matter because the U.S. has “perfect knowledge” of what the mullahs are up to, as John Kerry claimed last summer.
The larger point is that the nuclear deal has already become a case of Iran pretending not to cheat while the West pretends not to notice. 
That may succeed in bringing the agreement into force, but it offers no confidence that Iran won’t eventually build its weapon."